On the MG conditional connective $\alpha v$
or towards restoring the image of the Greek culture*

Eliza Kitis

Abstract

There has been a claim regarding the monosemicity or un-ambiguousness of theconnective $\alpha v$ of Modern Greek (MG), as compared to its translational equivalent
$if$ in English — with the additional claim that the Greek culture is far less ambiguous
than the English (Athanasiadou, 1997). In this paper, my aim is to restore thepicture of the MG conditional connective $\alpha v$, on the basis of an examination of real
data, demonstrating that, despite the existence of connectives such as $\epsilon\nu\omega$,‘while’, $a\rho\omicron\omicron\upsilon$, ‘since’, and $\alpha \mu\alpha$, ‘if[cond.temporal], MG $\alpha v$ can function, not only
as a conditional connective, but also as a concessive and adversative one, signifying
factuality as well, just like its English counterpart. Moreover, I will advance the
thesis that both English $if$ and MG $\alpha v$ are used in contrastive and concessive con-
texts, as well as conditional ones, as strategic devices of rhetorical structures.

Key words: conditionality, adversativity, concessivity, if, $\alpha v$, rhetorical construc-
tions, antiomial constructions, hypotheticality, Modern Greek

Notice on my son’s door

If you are, a pervert, a crook, a creep, a swindler, a slave trader, a Colombian drug
lord, a smuggler, a pimp, a burglar, a drunkard, Hitler, a Nazi, a lazy bum and es-
pecially a member of this family... KEEP OUT!!!

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and useful suggestions.
1. Introduction

This paper has a rather ‘interventionist’ character, as it is a response to claims made by Athanasiadou (1997), henceforth AA, in relation to the main monolexemic conditional subordinator of Modern Greek (MG) ἀν/ἄν or εἰάν/ειάν the translational equivalent of English if.\(^1\)

While the latter (if) has been claimed by several researchers to function not only as a conditional connective, but also as a concessive and adversative one, signifying factuality, on the other hand, MG ἀν ‘if’ has been claimed to unambiguously signify conditionality, but not concession or adversativity. On account of the alleged validity of this finding, also allegedly supported by an examination of other MG concessive connectives, that is, on the assumption that the domains of conditionality, concession or adversativeness are non-overlapping, divergent domains in Greek, the additional claim has also been advanced that the Greek culture is far less ambiguous than the English one (AA).

Conditional sentences are the foundation of logic, the cornerstone of syllogistic reasoning, and, as such, conditionals are the mortar of causation, explanation, confirmation, disposition, general laws and universal quantification. Conditionals are pivotal in scientific explanation, too, and all these areas mentioned here form a compact cluster of related issues in philosophy, in general: in metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, but also in psychology and, more recently, in cognitive science and knowledge representation systems (Elio and Pelletier 1997). This awareness then sanctions the epithet ‘primordial’ for the conditional connective (Kitis 1999).

Conditionals, just like all the other logical connectives, are truth functional. The conditional is true in all cases except when the antecedent is true and the consequent false.

Why are conditionals, then, so significant in all these domains? The answer has to lie in its potential for projecting the human mind into realms yet untrodden, in other words, into the realm of irrealis: of possible, alternative, fictional worlds. If this is so, then conditional markers must have a non-factual value, i.e. they must signal conditionality, hypotheticality, speculation, etc. Indeed, in Greek the same marker is used for indirect questions, conditional sentences, and wishes. This is not surprising (cf. Akatsuka 1986, Traugott 1985, Wakker 1994), as conditions and indirect questions point to disjunctive situations sig-

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\(^1\) For the time being we assume that the two subordinators are equivalent variants, though this need not be so (cf. Nikiforidou and Katis 2000, although I would not subscribe to their claims, see Κουτσούκη-Κητής ὑπὸ δημοσίευσιν).
naling uncertainty, on one hand, while wishes are placed in the sphere of irre-
realis, on the other.

In what follows, I will address this issue of factuality in relation to condi-
tional sentences. I will demonstrate that, despite what has been said (AA), and
the inherent irrealis character of conditional markers, the MG conditional
marker (ε)αν/(ε)αν can be used in contexts in which the protasis of the condi-
tional denotes factual states of affairs or events. In other words, it can be used
as a reality conditional marker, introducing factual protasic propositions. This
should not be surprising in view of similar potential of the English conditional
marker if. If and similar markers in other languages (Saloné 1983) have been
shown to be able to signify factuality, too, contingent on contextual factors or,
even, on co-textual ones; that is, it is often the case that the surrounding co-text
gives rise to a factual interpretation of if. The potential for signifying factuality
is a prerequisite for a conditional marker to develop meanings in the domains
of concessivity and adversativity.

However, it has been claimed by AA that “in Greek there is no such case as
if extending to concession or adversativeness, and thus causing ambiguities. As
far as adversativeness is concerned, in Greek this is a domain with no overlap-
ping or convergence with the other two domains [conditionality, concessivity]”
(: 14). On the basis of this claim, AA advances an argument relating to the na-
ture of the two cultures. She concludes:

“The present paper was an attempt to show that the ... three conceptual
domains [conditionality, adversativity, concessivity] are independent domains
but they exhibit different pictures in different languages. In English the do-
mains converge towards one another, which adds to the assumption that the
English culture seems to be a far more ambiguous culture compared with the
Greek one in which the domains diverge from one another”. (: 14)

The aim of this paper is precisely to show that the above claim, relating to the
divergence of the domains in Greek, is unfounded and, further, that any claims re-
lating to the diminished ambiguity of the Greek culture — on account of the ab-
sence of convergence of such domains — is, to say the least, unfortunate. In what
follows, I will first re-identify (following the literature) the contexts in which if has
been found to develop concessive and adversative meanings, and, then, examine
the behaviour of MG (ε)ἀν in such contexts. It will be shown that the MG condi-
tional connective, too, displays a similar behaviour, developing both concessive
and adversative meanings. I will also briefly review AA’s proposed classification
of MG concessive conditionals in order to demonstrate the vacuity of both the crite-
ria assumed and the emergent classification. In the next section, however, I will
present König's (1986) classification of types of conditional and concessive clauses and their typical properties, as a starting point for this discussion.

2. Basic distinctions

König (1986) distinguishes several types of conditionals, on the basis of the semantic relation between the component clauses of the complex conditional construction:

a. Conditionals, which entail neither their antecedents nor their consequents.

b. Concessive irrelevance conditionals, which share properties with either type a or type c. As a result this type is often classified either with type a or type c.²

c. Concessives, which entail both their component clauses.

While in simple conditionals of type (a) the consequent is related to a certain condition, in type (b), concessive irrelevance conditionals, the consequent is related to a set of conditions. This set can be specified by a disjunction (1a), a universal or "free-choice" quantifier (1b), or a focus particle as in (1c):

1. a. Whether he is right or not, we must support him.

   b. However much advice you give him, he does exactly what he wants to do.

   c. Even if you drink (only) a little, your boss will fire you. (König 1986: 231)

As is clear, concessive conditionals entail their consequents and are truth functional, since in logic it is sufficient that the consequent be true even when the antecedent is false for the conditional sentence to be true.³ So this type satisfies material implication conditions:

2. Irrespective of whether \( p \) or \( \neg p, q \).

According to König, this analysis is supported by morphological evidence as well. Indeed, in Greek, too, the connectives used for structures such as (1a) above are derived from the conditional marker:⁴

1a. \( \varepsilon i t e \ \varepsilon \chi e i \ \delta i m o \ \varepsilon i t e \ \delta e n \ \varepsilon \chi e i \), \( \pi r \varepsilon e i \ \nu a t o v \ \nu p o o s t h e r o z o u m e e \).

   'Whether he is right or not, we must support him'

\( \varepsilon i t e (e i t e) \) derives from the Ancient Greek (AG) conditional connective \( \varepsilon i (e) \):

³ Here we assume that conditionals have truth conditions ignoring other views (Mackie 1962, Edgington 1986, 1995).
⁴ Cf. Wakker (1994). Such clauses introduced by \( \varepsilon i t e \), 'either, or', are termed conditional clauses in Τζάκτζανος (1989) and Holton et al. (1997).
either < if(disj.) + and(partl.)

eithe < ei' + te

Table 1 from König (:234) summarizes the various properties of the three types:

Table 1. Types of conditionals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I.</th>
<th>a. Conditionals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>typical form: if p, (then) q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii.</td>
<td>entailments: —</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>b. Concessive (irrelevance) conditionals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. (∀x) (if p, q)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Even if p, q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>c. Concessives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As König (1986) notes, conditionals introduced by simple connectives are not normally interpreted as concessive conditionals. For example, (3) and (4) are very different in their interpretations, even though truth functionally they are equivalent:

3. *Ἀν πιεῖς κρασί, δὲν θα έρθω.*
   'If you drink wine, I’m not coming'.

4. *Ανόμα καὶ ἀν πιεῖς κρασί, δὲν θα έρθω.*
   'Even if you drink wine, I’m not coming'.

The differential interpretation lies in what Geis and Zwicky (1971) called ‘invited inference’ or ‘conditional perfection’. Example (3) invites the inference that if it is not the case that p, then there will be no q: (i) P ⊃ Q invites an inference of the form ~P ⊃ ~Q.

This inference or Gricean generalized conversational implicature does not arise in the case of concessive conditionals, and an example as (4) resists such an implicature, or does not invite such inferences. This is shown in the figure below:

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²I must note that I adhere to this classification, preserving the term adversativity for connectives such as *but, however,* etc. As will be shown below, however, I take the view that conditionals such as *if* can also be used rhetorically to mark adversativity and contrast.
It follows, therefore, that for a simple conditional to be interpreted as a concessive one, it must not license this inference.

3. Modern Greek connective (ε)αν: Concessive conditional

With this armoury, we can now examine some cases of conditionals and concessives or conditional concessives of MG, and compare them with their English counterparts. In this paper, I will not particularly assess AA’s claim about the three types of concessive connectives, an extension of Athanasiadou and Dirven’s (1996) classification of conditionals to concessives. A rather side concern in this paper would be with the MG alleged counterparts of the undifferentiated even if (Table II), expressing factuality in its course-of-eventness sense (CEC) only, hypothetically (HC) signaling scalarity, and pragmatic/conversationality (PC) denoting concession. In HC and PC uses, even if is not factive according to AA. That even if does not have the prerogative of monopolizing concessivity in English is rather clear to me, as it is to other researchers, too (cf. Haiman 1974, Kö nig 1986, Dancygier 1998). AA’s main point is that the three types of concessive even if have distinct lexical realizations in MG. However, the thesis put forward in AA is that the connectives in the right-most column (Table 2) are adversative rather than concessive, as is the general view. It is helpful to have a view of the final Table in Athanasiadou (1997: 14), displaying the distribution of the English and Greek conjunctions in the three domains, and their subtypes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditionality</th>
<th>Concession</th>
<th>Adversativeness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEC: if</td>
<td>PC: if</td>
<td>HC: even if</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ε)αν</td>
<td>(ε)αν</td>
<td>(ε)αν akoma ki an ke na esto ki an paroti ke pu molonoti, ki as</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 Dirven (1996) also adopts the same tripartite classification for concessive connectives of English.
In what follows, I will concentrate on AA’s claim that the Greek *if*, that is
(e)άν(e)an, does not extend to adversativity or concessivity, but rather unam-
biguously denotes conditionality, as this is the main concern of the paper. On
the basis of real data, I will demonstrate that, not only is this conditional con-
nective used to signal adversativity as well as concession, but is also used in a va-
riety of genres as a rhetorical adversarial structure.

3.1 Interrogative contexts: (E)άν as a concessive marker

First, I will start with some interrogative contexts, in which it has been noticed that
the conditional connective *if* is prone to acquire a concessive meaning (Ducrot
1972, Van der Auwera 1986, König 1986). Consider examples (5) and (6):

5. Θα πάς το πρωί στη δουλεία αν χιονίζει;
   ‘Will you go to work tomorrow morning if it is snowing?’
6. Θα το ξανάκανες αν έτρωγε η μα φορά πρόστιμο;
   ‘Would you do that again if you were fined (at least) once?’

We see that the simple conditional MG connective *an* tends to acquire a
concessive meaning in the interrogative context and is paraphrasable as (5a),
just like its English translational equivalent:

5a. Θα πάς το πρωί στη δουλεία ακόμα και αν χιονίζει;
   ‘Will you go to work tomorrow morning even if it is snowing?’
6a. Θα το ξανάκανες ακόμα και αν έτρωγες η μα φορά πρόστιμο;
   ‘Would you do that even if you were fined (at least) once?’

I may utter (5) when it is mutually known to me and the addressee that the
road he takes to go to work is one with hairpin bends, and skidding is likely in
adverse weather conditions. I am not concerned here with an explanation of
why *if* or *an*, in interrogative contexts, gravitates towards a concessive mean-
ing. My only concern is that indeed MG *an* can have this meaning in such con-

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7 Athanasiadou (at the oral presentation of this paper) objected that in interrogative contexts
or in some of my examples, (e)άν (=if) is pragmatic and, therefore, exempted from her state-
ment that (e)άν cannot signify concession or adversativity. But it must be stressed that AA
(1997) does not exclude any type of (e)άν (=if) in her all-sweeping generalization that the
MG paradigmatic conditional connective does not extend to concessivity and adversativity.
Moreover, (5) and (6) above, just like most of my other examples, are quite obviously not
conversational or pragmatic cases (PC) of (e)άν (=if), by any account or standards. It is clear
that both clauses in (5) and (6) are propositions related at a conceptual level. So (e)άν func-
tions concessively and contrastingly or adversatively, as I will show, at the ideational level.
(Cf. also Belouðης 1998).
texts and it, thus, appears an equi-valent translational counterpart of if, contrary to AA’s claim. I should only note that contextual assumptions seem to play a pivotal role in rendering both if and av concessive in interrogative contexts. But it is also significant that the q is not asserted but rather questioned. One of the properties characterizing the concessive type of clauses (in Table 1) is (iii), that is the presupposition or implication that ‘if p, then normally ~q’. This condition is absent in simple conditional clauses, in which the prevalent property is that of ‘conditional perfection’ or the invited inference that q only if p.\(^8\) It is also absent in simple conditional clauses in interrogative contexts such as (7):

7. *Αν τελικά έσβετε, θα συνεχίσετε την ερευνητική σας εργασία εδώ;*
   ‘If you end up here, will you carry on with your research?’

3.2 Scalarity

Another class of conditional clauses with av that tend to be interpreted concessively are those involving scalability as in (8):

8. *Αν πιείς μια γουλιά κρασί, δεν θα ’qθω,*
   ‘If you have a sip of wine, I am not coming’
   which can be paraphrased as (8a):

8a. *Καὶ μια γουλιά κρασί να πιείς, δεν θα ’qθω.*
   (‘And one sip of wine to drink...’)

This example conforms to König’s concessive (irrelevance) conditionals in class b of Table 1, and more specifically, it belongs to (b,i3), according to which even if \(p, q\). It is clear, then, that Q holds for the most lower value on a scale and hence it holds for all other values higher on this scale. Also compare (9):

9. *Αν ήπιε μια γουλιά κρασί, η γυναίκα του δεν το πρόσθεσε.*
   ‘If he had a sip of wine, his wife did not notice it’

Example (9) is paraphrasable as (9a):

9a. *Ακόμη μι αν ήπιε μια γουλιά κρασί, η γυναίκα του δεν το πρόσθεσε.*
   ‘Even if he had a sip of wine, his wife did not notice it’

\(^8\) For an explanation, see Van der Auwera (1986). The reason why interrogative contexts gravitate towards concessive interpretations is probably that connected propositions of conditionals are usually patterned on supposedly assumed common knowledge (as their entailments, Kitis 1999), and are not therefore likely to be questioned: Are you going to join your husband in N.Y. [his new place of residence] if you don’t find a job there?
3.3 (E)αν and other particles or anaphoric links

Another type of conditional clauses with αν that tends to acquire concessive meaning would be that in which the apodosis contains, somehow, the protasis, either due to a gap or due to an anaphoric link. An optional concessive particle may also appear in such protases.

10. Δεν ευχήθηκε ποτέ το βάνατο του. Αν ὅμως (if however) έγινε κάποια φορά θα ήταν τότε που την πήγαν στο νοσοκομείο με κατάγματα στα πλευρά.

‘She never wished for his death. But if this ever happened it must have been when she was taken to hospital with broken ribs’.

11. Αν τους είδαν δεν τους μιλήσαν.

‘If they saw them, they didn’t speak to them’.

Interestingly, ακόμη κι αν ‘akomi ki an’ (even if), the concessive connective, can substitute without any meaning loss or alterations for αν ὅμως ‘an omos’ (if nevertheless) in (10) and (11).

4. Properties of concessive (ε)αν

Resorting to Table 1, where all the properties of all types of conditional and concessive clauses are clearly displayed, we see that, in all these examples characterized by a concessive meaning, there is a total absence of conditional perfection, on one hand, which is a characteristic of conditionality, while q is in all these cases entailed or granted, a characteristic of concessivity (questions exempted). Moreover, there is a presupposition or implicature of type (b,iii) or (c,iii), another property of concessivity (König). That MG (ε)αν is used concessively is not surprising, in view of the function of its counterparts in other languages, but also as the equivalent AG conditional connective ετ [ean] ‘if’ was also, sometimes, used with a concessive force (Xenophon, de re equestri, l. 17) (Smyth 1920: 2379).

5. Modern Greek connective αν: From concession to adversativity

From concession to antithesis the distance does not seem to be great. If we concede to a state of affairs, an event or a fact, we are not thereby precluded from juxtaposing it with another state of affairs as well. Witness (12):


‘Do you know who I am? I am a lawyer’s wife’

B: Αν εἴσαι γυναῖκα δικηγόρου, εγώ εἶμαι γυναῖκα γιατροῦ.

‘If you are a lawyer’s wife, I am a doctor’s wife’
In (12B) αν ‘if’ is a concessive marker introducing a clause (p) that has just been uttered by the previous speaker and is repeated in B’s turn, in a conditional construction which has a concessive meaning. Speaker B accepts in her turn that A’s husband is a lawyer, as claimed by her, but she juxtaposes it to another state of affairs, the fact that she is a doctor’s wife. (12B) could be paraphrased as (12a), (12b) or (12c):

12a. Let’s accept, as you say, that your husband is a lawyer. So what? Mine is a doctor (even higher status!)
12b. Even if you are a lawyer’s wife, I am a doctor’s wife.
12c. You may be a lawyer’s wife but I am a doctor’s wife.

In (12B) both the p of the protasis and the q of the apodosis seem to be entailed by the context. This claim is substantiated if we insert the concessive connective ομωσίλομος ‘but, however’ in the apodosis. Although Τζόγλιακος (1989) notes that an antithetical connective can precede the apodosis in antithetical conditional constructions, he does not mention that it can be precisely this concessive connective ομωσί that can often convert a conditional αν-clause to a concessive one. Moreover, he enumerates the antithetical connectives μα/μα, αλλά/αλα and ομωσί/λομος, but it appears that only ομωσί has this prerogative, with μα and αλλά acting in coordinate structures. This type of ομωσί has a direct equivalent in English:

13. If Berners-Lee invented the Internet, I invented spell check.

If (13) is not granted contextually, on account of our world knowledge, however would do the trick:

13a. If Berners-Lee invented the Internet, I, however, invented spell check.

While ομωσί/λομος — or its translational equivalent in most contexts however — may be used in concessive contexts, it is not licensed in if-conditional protases that are used rhetorically in an adversarial structure, that is, in contexts where the protasis is not granted: If Al Gore invented the Internet, however, invented spell check. Example (14), on the other hand, needs still, the equivalent of ομωσί in some other contexts, to convert the conditional protasis into a concessive one:

14. If he is rich, he is still honest, translated into Greek as in (14a):

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9 But cf. Αν ο Χίλην έκαψε τους Εβραίους, μα δεν κάνουμε το ίδιο με τους Κούρδους σήμερα; ‘An o Hitler ekapse tus Evreus, ma den kanume to idio me tus Kourdus simera?’ (‘If Hitler incinerated the Jews, but don’t we do the same with the Kurds today?’)
14a. (Δεν ξέρω/Δεν μ’ ενδιαφέρει) Αν είναι πλούσιος, είναι όμως τίμιος.  

The following examples attest to the factual use of αν, which, moreover, is used in a contrastive manner to antiparathesesize facts or states of affairs or events. Not only does αν signify in the realis mode, but, also, both protasis and apodosis of the complex sentence denote factualities. Since it is not used conditionally in any sense, it is used concessively and, hence, antinomially.

15. Αν ο Χατζηνικολάου διαθέτει, πέραν των προσόντων του, και την πολύ άνωθεν στήριξη, ο Παύλος Τσίμας έχει το δίκιο του όπλο που λέγεται Λάκης Λαζόπουλος. (Εξοντία, 19-9-97)

‘If Chatzinikolaou has, on top of his qualifications, a few strings to pull, Pavlos Tsimas has his own weapon which is called Lakis Lazopoulos.’

16. Αν η επανάσταση της QuickCam είναι μέχρι στιγμής ‘αύριο’, τα μάτια του Internet δεν θ’ αγγίζουν να μπουν στη ζωή μας. (To Βήμα, 29-6-97)

‘If QuickCam’s revolution is still “invisible”, Internet’s eyes won’t take long to enter our lives.’

17. Αν για πολλές άλλες χώρες της ΕΕ το θέμα είναι τεχνοοικονομικό, για μας είναι θέμα επιβίωσης μπροστά στον τουριστικό επικοινωνισμό.

‘If this issue is technoeconomic for a number of other EU countries, for us it is an issue of survival vis-à-vis Turkish imperialism.’

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10 To the objection that (14a) does not sound so good, I would answer that it sounds as good as (14). However, the factuality and concessivity of its protasic if-proposition is confirmed, not only by όμως/όμως (nevertheless), but also by the insertion of the conjunctive connective και/και (and) as an additive focus particle in the apodosis as shown in (14b): Αν είναι πλούσιος, είναι όμως και τίμιος, ‘An ine pludios, ine omos ke timios’ (‘If he is rich, he is still and(=also) honest’). Moreover, cf. (14c): Αν δεν είναι πλούσιος, είναι όμως τίμιος, ‘An den ine pludios, ine omos timios’ (‘If he is not rich, he is nevertheless honest’). Example (14c) demonstrates that the degree of concessivity depends on the type of the conceptual relation construed or reflected in the complex sentence. It is interesting to note and worthy of further research that omos (still, nevertheless), as well as ke (and), can be inserted in the apodoses of (e)an-conditional clauses converting them to conditional concessives. Cf. a current billboard ad of ntl company in UK and its translation in MG: (i) If your home is computer free it doesn’t have to be internet free. (ii) An den exete computer sto spiti sas den iparsa los na min exete ke (and) internet. The additive particle ke in the apodosis is necessary for the enhancement of the concessive meaning of the protasis.

11 The speaker alludes to the interview with Mrs. Dimitra Papandreou-Liani, the late Prime Minister’s wife, secured by TV host, Mr. Chatzinikolaou. These examples of if-clauses may be called interpretive (Smith and Smith 1988) or metatextual (Dancygier 1998). However, it is worthy of note that they all license the insertion of the concessive particle όμως/όμως (however) but not of τότε/τότε (then).
In (15) to (17) concessive connectives αν ναί/ναι ke ‘if and’ (even if) can substitute for αν/ναι without any significant loss or modification of meaning. Since αν, just like if, can signal factivity and be a reality marker, temporal and causal connotations are not that far away. Αν, just like if, can have a rather temporal meaning approximating οταν/οταν ‘when’, as in (18) and (19):

18. Του \'χανε μούτσα, αν τον έβλεπε στο καφενείο.
   ‘He pulled a face if/when/every time he saw him in the pub.’
19. Θα εξεγρωθεία αν σου πω τι ύπαθα.
   ‘You’ll be outraged if/when I tell you what happened to me.’
20. Αν τον παντρεύεσαι και ατύχησες, γιατί πρέπει να κατηγορείς εμένα;
   ‘If you married him and have been unhappy, why should you blame it on me?’
21. Και τέλος, αν ακολούθησα τη φωτογραφία, είναι γιατί με ενδιέφερε.
   ‘And finally, if I took up photography, it was because I was interested in it.’
   (B. Посвящ., at broadcast Νόστος, 20-11-99, TV ET3)

In (20) and (21) in particular, we must note the aorist indicative in the protasis, which is used to signal perfectivity. The same holds for (9), (10) and (11), above. However, while in the latter the apodosis is either negated (9, 11) or in the inferential θα/θα + aorist past or past modal (10), in the former, (20, 21), the apodosis either presupposes the protasis, as in (20), in which it forms a felicity condition, or it is an explanation of it, as in (21).

6. Conditional clauses as rhetorical antinomial constructions

It is rather obvious that in the majority of the examples of the preceding section the conditional αν/ναι is used in a rhetorical construction acting as an exponent of antinomial states. I have claimed in recent work that temporal connectives are used as rhetorical constructions of contrast (Kitis forthcoming[a], Κουτσούμι-Κηφή 2001). I would like to argue that, very much in the same vein, conditional constructions are frequently put to work in a like manner, but Τζόρτζοβιτς (1989: 70) has ‘caught up with’ me. He writes:

«Πολλοί υποθετικοί λόγοι δεν είναι τίποτε άλλο παρά απλοί επεξεργασία τρόποι εκφράσεως, η οποία πολλές φορές χρησιμοποιείται υποθετικός λόγος όμως για να τεθεί μια υπόθεση και απ’ αυτή να εξακριβωθεί ένα συμπέρασμα, αλλά για να εκφραστεί κάποιο διανόημα ξανακάμπτει και παραστητικότερα.»

“Many conditional statements are little more than simple rhetorical modes of expression; that is, we often use a conditional statement, not because we want to make a supposition that will lead to a conclusion, but because we want to express a thought more vividly.”

12 Cf. Smyth (1920) on vivid conditionals in AG.
Clearly, *ἀν* is not a conditional connective in the traditional sense in some of the examples examined here, as it does not introduce a hypothesis or a condition, but rather is used to 'grant', or concede, the proposition of the protasis as a fact beyond any doubt. The role of the concessive character of the protasis is to enhance the force of the apodosis. Its function is rhetorical and strategic rather than anything else. It can be used in a contrastive manner, as we have seen and as Τσάρκης notes:

«...[Σ]ε ἐναν υποθετικό λόγο μπορεί με τὴν ὑπόθεσιν του να αποφάσειν παρατυποκόπτει... ἔρχονται ἀντίθεσις πρὸς το περιεχόμενο τῆς ἀποδοσίας. Τότε στὴν ἀπόδοσιν μπορεί να προτάσεσαι καὶ ἐνας ἄλλος ἀναθετικὸς συνδέσμος μα, ἀλλά, ὅμως: 'Ἀν ἦταν ἡ Παντανάσσα πρωτοπάξιμη, εμεῖς ἡμοιότατος πάλαις θαλασσομάχοι.' (70)»

"...the protasis of a conditional statement may express more vividly a strong contrast to the content of the apodosis. In this case, it is possible for the apodosis to be preceded by a contrastive connective *ἀλλά, ὅμως (=but)* 'If this was Pantanassa’s maiden voyage, we were seasoned seafarers’”.

However, the strong contrast is not the only reason for using this type of construction; neither is it always due to the factual character of the protasis or the apodosis, as the following examples witness:

22. *Ἀν εἰσ’ ἐλάοι ἔξυπνος, εγὼ τότε εἶμαι Αἰνοτάιν.*

‘If you’re intelligent, then I’m Einstein.’

23. *Ἀν τον εἶδες ἐσο, τον εἶδα κι ἐγὼ.*

‘If you saw him, I saw him too.’ (stress indicated)

24. «Ἀν ὁ Μπούφων ἔγραψε ἕνα μεγαλειώδες ἔργο, επιχειροῦσα να καταγράψει σὲ ἕνα βιβλίο τὸ σύνολο τῆς ζωολογίας, δεν μπορεί ἄρας να υπάρξει ἕνα παρόμοιο ἔργο με αντικείμενο τὴν κοινωνία;’ Ἡ φράση αντέχει στὸν Μπούφων καὶ συνοψίζει τὸ σχέδιο τῆς Ανδρόποντης Κυριακίου...»

"If Buffon wrote a grand work, trying to record in a single book the complete field of zoology, can there not be a similar work (one might ask) in the field of sociology as well?" This statement belongs to Balzac and it adumbrates the outline of *Human Comedy...”*

Example (22) is an instance of an indicative counterfactual. It is noteworthy that the substitution of ὅμως (=but, however, still), the concessive particle, for τότε, ‘then’ in the apodosis only (not in the protasis) of (22), will convert the protasic proposition into a concessive one. The proposition of the protasis in (22) is not an uncontroversial proposition accepted by the speaker as in the other cases we have seen; rather it is a context proposition (Akatsuka 1986, Kay 1997), to which, however, the speaker is not (or need not be) committed. (24) is
not contrastive in any sense, but the protasis is used rhetorically, as a grounding mechanism for the following discourse. The factuality of the protasis in (24) is not sanctioned by history only (Buffon 1777), but also by its participial clause.

The conditional construction is naturally used as a major premise in a syllogism and, as such, it is abundantly used in political discourse. But its factuality often depends on expediency:

25. ...ἀν αὐτὸ ἰσχύει στὶς πόλεις καὶ ἰσχύει πολὺ ἑντὸν ... εἶναι ἐντονῶτατο στὴν ἐπαρχιακῆ Ἑλλάδα ... Κι αὐτὸ πρέπει να σας πω ὅτι το ἱω ὡς ζήσει ... επειδή ἕχω κινηθεὶ πάρα πολὺ ... '...if this is the case in the cities and it is the case and very much so ... it is very evident that it is so in provincial Greece .... And (this) I must tell you that I have experienced it ... because I have been around quite a lot'.

(K. Karamanlis, party leader)

7. Modern Greek concessive connectives reviewed

In this section I will, finally, briefly review AA’s proposed distinction between concessivity and adversativity, with a view to challenging the tripartite classification suggested within the former domain for the MG connectives into HC (hypotheticality), PC (pragmaticity) and CEC (course-of-eventness) (an extension of Athanasiadou and Dirven’s, 1996, typology of conditionals, Table 2). However, my main objective is to examine the classification of MG connectives rather than the conceptual domains and distinctions proposed. Moreover, AA’s discussion is limited to specific examples rather than being theoretically substantial.

The writer argues that in CEC concessives the two propositions denote “real events” which “presuppose the factual character of even if which here can be substituted with [sic] although” (1997: 7). But if although can substitute for even if in some CEC cases, so can any of the MG connectives which she categorizes as adversative (molonotis, ki as, and many others that are omitted in her discussion and final table). On the other hand, παρότι/παροτι, μολονότι/molonotis (: 12) and καὶ πῶς/καὶ πῶς are interchangeable in concessive and adversative contexts, probably because a distinction on the grounds drawn in AA is not viable. Moreover, these allegedly adversative only connectives, as well as the whole gamut (all subtypes) of concessives, can fit the bill – as shown in (26) - in what AA calls conversational concessives categorized as PC (pragmatic) under concession (Table 2), while according to her only esto ki an is admitted to this class:

26. Even if/though you’re not hungry, there’s food in the fridge.
A esto ki an
den pinas, iparxi fayito sto psiyo.
(akoma) ki an / ke na / ki as
min/den pinas, iparxi fayito sto psiyo.
B paroti / parolo pu / molonoti / an ke
den pinas, iparxi fayito sto psiyo.

Examples (26B), which entail their antecedents, are acceptable, but become straightforwardly acceptable as a piece of naturally occurring conversation if one adds expressions such as ‘as you say’ or ‘now’: 13

26 i. Even though / Although you’re not hungry now/as you say, there’s food in the fridge.
paroti / parolo pu / molonoti /
den pinas tora/opos les, iparxi
ki as (min)(postposed)

fayito sto psiyo

ii. Ke na pinasis, iparxi fayito sto psiyo.
(‘Even if you get hungry, there’s food in the fridge’)

But, apparently, AA wants to distinguish between those connectives signaling factuality (B group) and those that do not (A group) of (26). But, then, we are back to square one where concession (AA’s term) or concessive conditionals (König’s term), on one hand, and adversative (AA’s term) or concessives (König’s term) are mainly distinguished in terms of their entailments; while the former do not necessarily entail their antecedent, the latter do. Moreover, we often need to assume factuality of the two propositions in order for the contrast to emerge stronger. 14 What is noteworthy, however, with regard to (26) is that we can have almost the whole gamut of MG concessive conne-

13 From a small survey I conducted, native speakers of Greek opted predominantly for και/καί κε (although) (not mentioned or discussed in AA) when asked to fill in and prioritize the concessive connectives in the blank of (26). Their choice can probably be accounted for in terms of the predominant perception of an ke as the main concessive connective of MG. The insertion of τοιχικά / τά / ‘now’, or συμφωνος λεγ/οπος λες, ‘as you say’, in (26i), would eliminate constraints mentioned in Nikiforidou (1990) relating to direct concessives. The same constraints would hold in English too. Moreover, the entailment of (26B) can be eliminated by modalization: ‘An και μπορεί να μην πεινάς... ‘An ke mporei na min pinas...’ ‘Although you may not be hungry...’ Then (26A) and (26B) become semantically and pragmatically equivalent. Transliteration in this part is required to follow AA’s examples and discussion.

14 Note the MG equivalent of If you’re so clever, why aren’t you rich? Αφού/Μαλάν είσαι τόσο έξυπνος, γιατί δεν είσαι πλούσιος? ‘Afou/Mala-an ise toso ekspnos yiati den ise plusios?’ Both afu (since) and ama (if/when [with a strong temporal dose]), signifying temporality and hence factuality, are preferred as concessive-adversative connectives in this context. Τζόρζανος (parag. 253) writes: “the adversativeness is normally expressed towards something that the speaker assumes as factual” (my translation). Although Τζόρζανος is not cited in AA, it is rather transparent that her proposed distinction between concessives and adversatives draws on his argument that some MG concessive connectives express adversativity.
tives, depending on the factuality assumed in the protasis proposition. Moreover, even group A connectives need not signal their speaker’s lack of knowledge as to their addressee’s state of hunger, for, as Akatsuka (1986) noted with respect to if-clauses, a conditional clause — rather than a causal one — is likely to be used if a contextually given \( p \) represents newly learned information rather than the speaker’s own knowledge.

It is more than clear that (26i, ii) are all instances of pragmatic conditionals (PC) according to AA, and equally clear that not only is her distinction between the two broad domains of concession and adversativity untenable, but also her tripartite distinction of the concessive domain is equally indefensible.

AA’s main reason for distinguishing between concessives and adversatives is that in the latter (though, even though, although) “there is no relation of causal or suppositional dependency between the main clause and the subclause”, but of an “intrinsic contrast” (AA: 10). However, it is not very clear what exactly the writer means by this and concludes that “Adversative settings, then, are used when speakers want to explain a deliberate and intrinsic contrast to the situation described in the main clause. While in concession the contrast may be affected and not hold [sic], in adversativeness, because of the intrinsic basis for contrast, it is always factually true.” (AA: 10).

While I can’t see what is offered towards a better understanding of this class of connectives, other than labeling König’s concessives as “adversatives”, as regards the MG connectives, which is our focus here, we can conclude that indeed they deserve a thorough examination before one makes judgements as to their admissibility to conceptual domains and improvised classes. Besides, when AA claims that in although, though and even though (her class of adversative connectives) there is no “conditional link because there cannot be any relation of dependency between the antecedent and the consequent, [t]here is only an adversative link” (: 13), she ignores all implicational meanings and disregards that there is a conventional conditional presupposed or implicated between the protasis proposition and the negation of the apodosis (König 1986, Kay 1991). This implied conditional link, called “paradoxicality” (Yamaguchi 1989) — common in both concessive conditionals and concessives (AA’s adversatives) — , is the springboard for comprehending adversativeness and contrast (Kitis 2000, forthcoming[a]).

Moreover, the main concessive connective \( \textit{av} \ nu, \textit{lit. if and, ‘although’}, \) (Τσάρτσινος 1989, Σιδηροπούλου 1990, Καραντζόλα 1995, Holton et al. 1997, Kortmann 1997), which, interestingly enough, is directly related, morphologically, to the prototypical MG connective \( \textit{an} \), is not discussed or mentioned, neither does it
appear in AA’s final table. Furthermore, the writer seems to be rather oblivious to
the verb forms accompanying concessive connectives in antecedent protases. Her
thesis that esto ki an is a concessive connective used in PC (pragmatic/conversa-
tional) and HC (hypothetical/((?))conditional) contexts only to mark hypothetically or
unreality collapses, once the same hypothetical concessive conditionals are coupled
with different verb forms:
27. Esto ki an tin eðerne, afti ton latreve.
‘Even if he beat her, she adored him’.

But one might object that (27) is no longer a hypothetical conditional (HC)
but rather a CEC one (course-of-event)—it can’t be pragmatic or conversa-
tional (PC); but if this is so, then esto ki an should appear in the relevant class
in AA’s table and would then vitiate her claim about the distinguishability of
MG concessive connectives.

There is also a host of infelicities in the writer’s treatment of even the English
connectives; for example, with regard to although she fails to acknowledge the well
attested thesis that its proposition is entailed or presupposed (R. Lakoff 1971,
Halliday and Hasan 1976, Koutoupi-Kitis 1982), and tries to account for infelic-
tous sentences such as (28) in terms of a lack of “intrinsic contrast”:
28. i. ?Although he goes away, I will stay
ii. ?Although you are not hungry, there is food in the fridge. (AA: 11)

Apart from the answer to AA’s problem entailed above in (26i), which would
dissolve her concept of the lack of “intrinsic contrast”, a mere replacement of
verb forms would have the same result.

15 Cf. Smyth (1920: 2369) as regards AG: “Concessive clauses are commonly formed by xai
((ke=and)) in conjunction with the ei ([if] or éav [if] of conditional clauses: xai ei (xel), xai
éav (xel) even if, ei xai, éav xai although”. Smyth (: 2370) continues: “Such concessive clauses
are conditional, but indicate that the condition which they introduce may be granted without
destroying the conclusion. The apodosis of concessive clauses thus has an adversative meaning,
i.e. it states what is regarded as true notwithstanding (διώς) what is assumed.” (my emphasis).
16 Cf. Τρόμος (paragr. 253) for interchangeability of xai aŋki as and éo xai aŋ/esto ki an,
adversative and concessive respectively, in AA’s terms.
17 Cf. Although he goes to church every Sunday, his wife stays at home to prepare the meal. The
answer to AA’s puzzle can be sought in Vendler (1967) or Mourelatos (1981). Space does not
allow discussion. Similar infelicities attach to her judgement of implausibility of perfectly ac-
tceptable uses of sentences such as Even if I knew him, I did not recognize him; cf. Dancygier’s
(1998) examples: If I have met him, I didn’t recognize him (: 27), If I ever read this book, I have
forgotten it altogether (: 111).
29. Although he's going away / he left, I will stay.

Further, the indeterminacy of the factuality of even if is attributed to polysemy carrying along in its sway the MG connectives (AA: 12). All in all, what is, in essence, involved in AA's discussion of both the English connectives as well as the MG ones is the notion of entailment, which is glossed over. Yet this notion is well attested in discussions of connectives. So is the notion of context-proposition (Haiman 1974, Akatsuka 1986, Kay 1997).  

I think I have said enough to support the point that, while the Greek language affords a plethora of concessive connectives, one cannot, indeed should not, light-heartedly differentiate amongst them on such flimsy grounds and criteria as those offered in AA, especially if one does not make use of attested conceptual tools.

8. Concluding

The prototypical conditional connective of MG an has been examined here with a view to demonstrating that, contrary to arguments advanced relating to its pure conditional meaning, its meaning and function extend beyond condition-ality to domains such as concessivity and adversativity. Concessive connectives of MG regarded in AA (1997) as falling within delimited categories have also been reviewed and shown to have been so categorized on untenable grounds and criteria. The key notions within the spectrum of epistemic stance (Fillmore 1990) that are detrimentally missing in AA's account are 'context-proposition' (which does not require the speaker's commitment), as a property assigned to even if-clauses, as well as 'entailment', characterizing although-, even though-and though-clauses. These properties of protasic propositions are pivotal for a serious discussion of the nature of MG concessive connectives, as are implicated, implicit or presupposed conditional statements, in the use of concessive and adversative statements, in general (Kay 1991, Kitis forthcoming[a]). Moreover, I believe to have provided evidence that AA's account cannot seriously challenge current categorizations such as König's (1986).

It follows, therefore, that any further claims relating to the nature of the Greek culture on account of the allegedly (un)conditional purity of an and the categorization of concessive connectives of MG into distinct subtypes of con-

18 Cf. AA's battling with various impressionistic notions "negotiation or permissiveness or even indifference" (: 12) when the well attested pragmatic notion of 'context-proposition' would have solved her problem, even if added little to our understanding of connectives.
cessivity and adversativity are, to say the least, unfortunate.\textsuperscript{19} I have, further, claimed that on account of its meaning extension to realms of concessivity and adversativity, \textit{av(if)}, just like other connectives, affords the potential for its rhetorical use in a variety of genres. Indeed, there are some rhetorical uses of conditional structures a perspicuous account of which can be given only in terms of constructions (Kay 1991, Kitis forthcoming[b]).

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\textsuperscript{19} One can note that in MG participial clauses or gerunds have various readings, ranging from temporal to causal and modal, depending on the conceptual relations between the two clauses each time. This is impossible in English where distinct connectives will each time translate those gerunds. Also connectives like \textit{capot}, \textit{afu}, can be both temporal and causal, but in English this connective will be variously translated as \textit{after} or \textit{since}. However, it is clearly unwise to base judgements about the ambiguity of cultures on such issues, even if we ignore the question of the meaning of ambiguity in this context.


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